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Voluntary Handicaps-Should Drug
Abuse, Alcoholism and Obesity be
Protected by Pennsylvania's AntiDiscrimination Laws?
I. Introduction

Joyce English is 5'8" tall and weighs 341 pounds.' She is presently unemployed.2 On April 26, 1977, Ms. English applied for a job
as a customer service clerk at the Philadelphia Electric Company
and passed all the pre-employment criteria but one: weight. Ms.
English is more than twice her "desirable weight" as defined by the
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company tables. 3 Philadelphia Electric's employment standards routinely require the rejection of such
applicants.4
On May 4, 1977 Ms. English sought relief before the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC) 5 from discrimination on the basis of her handicap, obesity. The Commission
determined that "[S]he is entitled to be offered the next available
position as customer service clerk with [Philadelphia Electric], and to
receive back pay with interest." 6 The Commission's decision is pres1. English v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., No. E-12163, op. at 3 (Pa. Human Rel. Comm'n.
March 31, 1980).
2. Brief for Respondent at 53, Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Pa. Human Rel. Comm'n. (English), No. 1033 C.D. 1980 (Pa. Commw. Ct., petition for review filed April 25, 1980). The brief
holds that Ms. English "left Philadelphia because she could not find work and could barely
survive and provide for her son on welfare . . . . [Sihe was forced to return to Pensacola,
Florida, where most of her family resides. . .[and] sought to mitigate damages by diligently
seeking employment." Id
3. Although these tables are widely used by insurers, several authorities have questioned the scientific validity of the methods employed and categories used in these tables. The
main contention is that weight and height alone are insufficient to define obesity. See J.
MAYER, OVERWEIGHT: CAUSES, COSTS AND CONTROL 28-44 (1963).
4. It was Philadelphia Electric's policy not to hire anyone more than forty pounds overweight. Although the policy was not rigidly enforced, it was applied as a matter of general
policy. English v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., No. E-12163, op. at 9 (Pa. Human Rel. Comm'n
March 31, 1980).
5. The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission is the agency charged with enforcement of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-962 (Purdon
1964 & Supp. 1980-81).
6. English v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., No. E-12163, op. at 20 (Pa. Human Rel. Comm'n
March 31, 1980).

ently on appeal before the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.7
The English8 case presents the first opportunity for Pennsylvania courts to address the protection afforded handicapped individuals by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA).9 The
issues inherent in English require not only that a definition of handicapped be determined, a decision affecting thousands of Pennsylvania workers' ° and employers,"I but that the definition be forged
within the context of the highly controversial question 12 that arguably voluntary 3 conditions, such as alcoholism, obesity and drug
abuse are to be protected as handicaps.
II.

Defining the Questions

In considering the inclusion of a (given) condition within the
protection of an anti-discrimination law, a court undertakes two conceptually distinct analyses. First a legal meaning is ascribed to
"handicapped," then and only then, does the court determine that
the particular condition merits classification as a handicap. Each
question has its own imperatives.
For example, the courts of Wisconsin' 4 and Illinois 5 have
ascribed legal meaning to the word handicap for the purpose of antidiscrimination law. t6 Both courts purported to adopt the "ordinary
7. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Pa. Human Rel. Comm'n. (English), No. 1033 C.D. 1980
(Pa. Commw. Ct., petition for review filed April 25, 1980).
8. Id
9. Passed in 1955, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act prohibits discrimination in
housing, employment and public accommodations. Its protections extend to racial, gender,
religious and national origin classifications as well as the handicapped. The extension of the
PHRA to "handicapped" individuals, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81) is
the first instance in which the class protected by the Act is not clearly defined. Thus, the scope
of the definition given to the terms will define the scope of the jurisdictional coverage granted
under the Act.
10. See, U.S. DEPT. OF H.E.W., PEOPLE POWER: REPORT ON THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON REHABILITATION OF THE DISABLED AND DISADVANTAGED, 124-133 (1969).

11. The original Pa. Human Relations Act, covered only employers employing twelve or
more persons, but the Legislature significantly expanded the coverage by including employers
with only four or more employees. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(b) (Purdon 1964) (amended
by Act of Jan. 24, 1966, Pa. Law 1525, § I).
12. See Fat People Fight Back Against Bias, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., September 29,
1980 at 69-70.
13. The dictionary defines voluntary as "brought about of one's own accord or by free
choice," RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1601 (1979). This com-

ment classifies obesity and alcohol and drug use as voluntary because arguably, they are
"brought about by free choice."
14. See Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Labor, Indus. & Human Rel.,
62 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443 (1974).
15. See Advocates for the Handicapped v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d 512, 385
N.E.2d 39 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979).
16. Wisconsin's fair employment statute defines the handicap class by stating: "It is discrimination because of a handicap for an employer to refuse to employ . . . terminate from
employment ... discriminate against any individual. . . unless such handicap is reasonably
related to the individual's ability to undertake the job-related responsibilities of that individual's employment." WIS. STAT. ANN. § I 1.32(5)(f. The closest the Illinois Legislature came
to defining handicap is (West Supp. 1980-81) a "handicap [is] unrelated to one's ability to

meaning"' 7 or "common usage,"' 8 of handicapped,' 9 yet each
reached a very different understanding of the term.
In Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Pauland Pacific Railroadv. Wisconsin, Department of Labor, Industry & Human Relations,2" the Wisconsin Supreme Court defined a handicap as "a disadvantage that
makes achievement unusually difficult."'" The court determined
that the purpose of Wisconsin's Fair Employment Law was to "foster the employment of all properly qualified individuals," conse-

quently restricting an employer's right to "[dliscriminate against
those who, though female, old, handicapped or whatever, can function efficiently on the job."22 Only after it arrived at an inclusive
definition, did the court determine asthma to be a handicap.2 3
The Illinois Appeals Court, on the other hand, took a far more
restrictive view of the handicapped class. InAdvocatesfor the Handicapped v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 24 it held the common meaning of
handicap to be a "physical or mental condition that is generaly believed to impose severe barriers upon the ability of an individual to
perform major life functions."2 5 The Illinois decision expressly rejected the definition adopted in Wisconsin. Under the Sears court's
understanding of the Wisconsin formulation, in order for "any physical condition to reach the level of a handicap protected by the Act,
perform jobs or positions available to him for hire or promotion.
... ILL. CONST. art. 1,
§ 19. These statutes define handicap in terms of job relatedness rather than physical characteristics.
In Pennsylvania, the legal definition of handicapped will be formulated by the courts as
the legislative definition merely states "a 'non-job related handicap' means any handicap or
disability which does not substantially interfere with the ability to perform the essential functions of employment ..
" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 95 4 (p) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). The
definition offers guidance as to when a handicap is job-related, but leaves to the judiciary the
decision if the handicapped class is to be limited by any other criteria.
17. Advocates for the Handicapped v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d 512, 515,
385 N.E.2d 39, 43 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979).
18. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Labor, Indus. & Human Rel., 62
Wis. 2d 392, 398, 215 N.W.2d 443, 446 (1974).
19. This reflects a long standing rule of statutory construction typified by I PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1903(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81): "Words and phrases shall be construed . . .
according to their common and approved usage ...
." Id Handicap's entymology shows that
it came into common usage only 1880. Handicap originated in horse racing, where weights
were added to impede the performance of a superior horse. FOWLER'S MODERN ENLISH USAGE 238 (2d ed. 1965).
It appears that the common usage of handicap refers to some impediment to performance,
but the degree and nature of the impediment necessary to create a handicap is not a matter of
common understanding. (Certainly the highly speculative nature of "handicapping" at the
race track points this out.) The "common usage" rule of construction does not provide a
meaning for handicap in the abstract and therefore offers little aid in giving legal content to
"handicap" for the purposes of fair employment law.
20. 67 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443 (1974).
21. Id at 398, 215 N.W.2d at 446 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY 1027 (Unabr. 1961)).
22. Id at 397, 215 N.W.2d at 445.
23. Id at 398, 215 N.W.2d at 446.
24. 67 Ill. App. 3d 512, 385 N.E.2d 39 (1978), ceri. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979).
25. Id at 517, 385 N.E.2d at 43 (emphasis added).

an employer need only act upon that condition and deny the individual employment."2 6 To the Illinois court, then, the Wisconsin opinion's focus on the employer's failure to consider the employee's
merit, rather than on the nature and severity of the employee's objective physical impairments, had the effect of "transforming the Act 27
into a universal anti-discrimination law," 28 a result clearly outside
the Legislature's intent.
Both courts arrive at a definition through an interpretation of

the applicable fair employment statute. Clearly, the basic issue in
the opinions is the intended purpose and effect of the statutes, not
the "common" understanding of who is handicapped. The other jurisdictions that have defined handicapped for the purposes of antidiscrimination laws parallel either the Wisconsin position, that the
anti-discrimination statutes underlying policy of merit selection requires an inclusive definition,2 9 or the Illinois position, that a restrictive definition is necessary to avoid universally accessible fair
employment protections." This comment will, therefore, examine
which position most comports with values underlying the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act by analyzing the Act's history, language, and past judicial interpretation. 3
26. Id at 516, 385 N.E.2d at 43.
27. Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped Act, ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 48, § 851 (SmithHurd Supp. 1980-81).
28. Advocates for the Handicapped v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 67 111.App. 3d 512, 516,
385 N.E.2d 39, 43 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979).
29. See Matter of State Division of Human Rights v. Averill Park Cent. School Dist., 46
N.Y.2d 950, 388 N.E.2d 729, 415 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1979) (mistaken classification of an individual
as partially deaf deemed a handicap). Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R. v. Washington State
Human Rights Comm'n, 87 Wash. 2d 802, 557 P.2d 307 (1976) (individual suffering from
slight impairment of knees due to surgery deemed to be handicapped).
30. A clearer example of the type of reasoning that leads to a restrictive definition of
handicap can be found in Providence Journal Co. v. Mason, 116 R.I. 614, 359 A.2d 682 (1976).
In deciding whether an individual who suffered from a whiplash injury that resulted in minor
paralysis and required the use of a neck collar was covered by the R.I. Fair Employment
Practices Act, (R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 25-5-1 to 39 (1968)) the court determined that even under
an explicit statutory definition that "A 'physical handicap' means any physical disability, malformation, or disfigurement which is caused by bodily injury ... and which shall include, but
not be limited to any degree of paralysis ... lack of coordination,. . .or physical reliance on
• . .[a] remedial appliance or device," R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(H) (Supp. 1978), the individual was not handicapped.
Acknowledging that the plaintiff suffered some paralysis and wore a remedial device, the
court reasoned that literal application of the statutory definition would result in protecting all
injuries, effectively expanding coverage beyond the limits which could be attributed to reasonable legislators. In Mason, the court's perception ofpurpose, overrode even the literal words of
the statute. The definition of handicap, then, turns on statutory policy, not on statutory language. See also Burgess v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248 (1979)
(incipient glaucoma not a handicap).
31. This approach follows the requirements of the construction rules codified at I PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81):
When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly
may be ascertained by considering among other matters:
(I) The occasion and necessity of the statute;
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted;
(3) The mischief to be remedied;

Defining handicapped, even inclusively, does not, however, necessarily mean that obesity, alcoholism, or drug abuse are within the
stated formula. The fact that such conditions are arguably voluntary
involves considerations distinct from the question of what is the actual degree of impairment intended to be protected by a given fair
employment statute.3 2 It is the cause, rather than the severity at issue. Nonetheless, the mere fact that an action is a matter of free
choice is in itself meaningless. The legal effect of a volitional act
stems less from the character of the action than from the legal context in which the act is performed.3 3 Moreover, the value society
places in preserving a particular choice may have legal significance.
For example, choice of one's religion is a voluntary act, yet its
protection by anti-discrimination laws is unquestioned.3 4 Drug
abuse, alcoholism, and obesity on the other hand are arguably less
volitional than religious preference, 35 yet strenuous objections are
raised to their protection by the same laws.3 6 The distinction does
not flow from the voluntary nature of the acts, but from the moral
distaste society has for overindulgence in food, drugs or alcohol as
compared to the fundamental value society places on religious
choice. The classification of voluntary conditions as handicaps,
therefore, requires an understanding of society's moral evaluation of
the interests being promoted or discouraged. The crucial issue then,
is whether societal condemnation of overindulgence in food, alcohol,
or drugs outweighs societal interests in a non-discriminatory work(4) The object to be attained;
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects;
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation;
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history;
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statutes.
32. Even though the Wisconsin Dept. of Labor, Industry and Human Relations utilized
the inclusive definition of handicapped formulated in Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Labor, Indus., and Human Rel., 62 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443 (1974) the
Department held that obesity was not a handicap, although it reserved the right to include
other voluntary conditions within the statute's protection. See Plizka v. A.O. Smith Corp., No.
- (Wis. Dept. of Indus. Labor & Human Rel. Aug. 19, 1975). This decision illustrates that it
is logically consistent to take an inclusive view of the handicap class, but consider voluntariness to be a factor that may exclude a given condition from the broadly defined class. The
importance of understanding that conceptually discrete issues are involved in voluntary handicaps cannot be overemphasized. Formulating a restrictive definition solely because the complainant is obese would do a disservice to others whose conditions may not bear the stigma of
assumed volition. The effects of voluntariness under an inclusive definition are discussed in
the text accompanying notes 161-171 infra.
33.

See S. PUFFENDORF, ELEMENTORUM JURIS PRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIs LIBRI DUE

265-280 (1672).
34. See Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1135 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(discussing the basis for inclusion of religion within the coverage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
From its inception, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act has afforded protection from
discrimination on the basis of religious creed. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (Purdon 1964).
35. See notes 168 and 169 and accompanying text infra (discussing the validity of the
presumption of free choice in obesity, alcoholism and drug abuse).
36. Ogden, Justice and the Problem of the Volitional Victim, 28 LAB. L.J. 417 (1977).

place.3 7 This comment will offer an analysis of how condemnation
of the voluntary conditions have been balanced against other societal
interests in related areas of the law.
III.

Related Areas of the Law: Purpose, Definitions and Volition

The terms handicap and disability evoke a continuum of meanings as the concepts move across the legal landscape. For example,
in a Pennsylvania law that provides an exclusive fishing area for the
handicapped,3" the definition of handicapped includes only individuals whose mobility is severely impaired.3 9 The definition does not
extend coverage to many individuals ordinarily considered handicapped. Yet precisely because it outlines only impairments that severely restrict access to fishing areas, this narrow definition is
perfectly consistent with the general purpose of the fishing laws that
all persons have equal access to wild animals under public protection.4 °
At the other end of the continuum, Pennsylvania statutes regulating elections permit a qualified voter who is physically disabled to
request assistance when voting. A voter may declare himself disabled by so stating under oath and by having the nature of the disability recorded. 4' This broad definition of disabled serves the
legislative purpose of maximizing individual access to the polls,
while providing a means to protect against fraud. The following discussion aims to identify the PHRA's location within the continuum,
as well as examine the treatment afforded alcoholism, obesity, and
drug abuse in areas of the law in which case law on the handicap
class has been developed.4 2
37. The proposition that finding an act to be a matter of free choice will have legal consequences is at least as old as Justinian. "In maleficiis voluntas spectalur,non exius'" (In evil
deeds regards must be to the intention and not to the result.) DIG. 48, 8,14. The law, however,
has progressed to the point where the legal consequences for an act determined to be voluntary
need not be punishment in every legal context. See DEL VECCHIO, PHILOSOPHY OF THE LAW,
257 (8th ed. 1954). See also note 169 and accompanying text infra.
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 252.1 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
39. Disabled person as used in this section means any person who is suffering from
paraplegia and has permanent paralysis of both legs and lower parts of the body or is
suffering from hemi-plegia . . .resulting from traumatic injury to spinal chord or
brain, or has suffered amputation of both feet or one foot.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 252.1(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
40. 38 C.J.S. Game §§ 5,7 (1943 & Supp. 1980).
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3058 (Purdon 1963).
42. For definitions of disability in other, less related, areas of the law, see 51 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6037 (Purdon 1976) (disability in the military crime of maligering); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 1008.3 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81) (denial of auto insurance because of a disability); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 390-5 (Purdon 1963) (disabilities effecting the licensing of pharmacists).

A.

Workmen's Compensation

The basic purpose of Workmen's Compensation 43 is to shift the
burden of occupational injuries from the individual employee to the
employer, who in turn shifts the burden to the marketplace by adding the cost of compensation to the product." The employer is
strictly liable for all injuries arising in the course of employment, 45
but the amount of compensation to the employee is statutorily defined.4 6
Consistent with the remedial purpose, disability is defined as
"the loss of earning power as the result of an injury. '47 Thus, disability is a flexible concept used only to measure the degree of injury
in order to determine the appropriate amount of compensation. A
physical condition is considered a disability because of its effect on
the ability to perform, not because of its inherent nature.4 8 The use
of the term disability in the workmen's compensation context undermines an assumption that the legislature has mandated that handicap be limited only to certainphysical characteristics, rather than the
inability to perform under fair employment law.4 9
Workmen's compensation considers "voluntary" conditions in
the context of two doctrines found in tort law: assumption of the
risk5" and pre-existing conditions." The Pennsylvania Workmen's
Compensation statute specifically eliminates the defense of assumption of the risk. Benefits are denied, however, if the injury is selfinflicted. 2 The legislature determined that even when an individual
voluntarily and unreasonably places himself in a position of danger,
he should not have to suffer the burden of a resultant injury without
compensation.
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania applied this policy
43.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit, 77, §§ 1-1603 (Purdon 1952 & Supp. 1980-81).

44. "The cost of the product should bear the blood of the workman." W. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS, 530 (4th ed. 1977). See also L. KNOLL, Forwardto Title 77 in 77 PURDON'S PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES ANNOTATED ix

45.

(1952).

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 431 (Purdon 1952).

46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 501-582 (Purdon 1952) (rules governing the amount of the
compensation award).
47. Keiser v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 134 Pa. Super. Ct. 104, 105, 4
A.2d 188, 189 (1939). There is no statutory definition of disability despite the fact that the law
contains a compensation schedule for total disabilities, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 511 (Purdon

Supp. 1980-81) and a separate schedule for partial disability, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 512
(Purdon Supp. 1980-81).

48. "The indemnity is based on disability to work, not on the physical injury as such."
99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 296 at 1035 (1958).
49. This is the assumption underlying the narrow definition found in Advocates for the
Handicapped v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 67 111.3d 512, 385 N.E.2d 39 (1978), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 981 (1979). See notes 24-30 and accompanying text supra.
50.

W. PROSSER, LAWS OF TORTS 525 (4th ed. 1977).

51.

Id at 262.

52.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 431 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).

to alcohol abuse in Fink v. Workmen's Compensation Board5 3 In
awarding compensation to the survivors of a drowned swimming
pool worker proven to have been intoxicated at the time of the accident, the court held:
Section 201 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 41 spiecifically prohibits an employee from collecting damages from is employer in an action at
law if the employer. . . demonstrates that the employee's injury
was caused by his intoxication. We are in this case dealing with a
compensation claim, however and not an action at law. . . . Section 301(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 43 only prohibits compensation
. . . there is no evidence that
. . . if the injury is self-inflicted
54
drowning was self-inflicted.
Thus, intoxication was not seen as being a matter of free choice to
the extent that it caused a self-inflicted injury.
The same result ensues when the employer uses a defense of
pre-existing conditions. Risks personal to the employee are not compensable unless the conditions of employment are shown to aggravate, accelerate or combine with the pre-existing conditions to cause
death or disability.55 In MississipiAssociation of InsuranceAgents V.
Seay, 56 the employer provided uncontroverted proof that the employee was obese and a heavy drinker and smoker.57 The employer
contended that these voluntarily assumed conditions were sufficient
to cut off his liability for a heart attack that occurred during the
course of the employee's employment. By rejecting this reasoning,
the court implicitly found that when the conditions of employment
are a substantial cause of the injury, the underlying legislative intent
to compensate such injuries renders the voluntariness of pre-existing
conditions legally insignificant.5"
Fink and Seay illustrate that state legislatures may be willing to
shift the burden of the voluntary conditions of an individual employee to the employer, when the social policy so mandates. Having
shifted the burden to employers in the injury context, one could reasonably expect a similar shift of burden in the hiring context. 9
53. 37 Pa. Commw. Ct. 67, 388 A.2d 1152 (1978).
54. Id at 69, 388 A,2d at 2253 (emphasis added). The Fink court found that although
intoxication at the time of injury was sufficient at law for the individual to bear the consequences of the injury, the overriding purpose of Workmen's Compensation, that the burden of
injuries be shifted to the employer, renders the voluntary nature of the intoxication irrelevant.
55.

A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 12.20 (1980).

56. 218 So. 2d 413 (Miss. 1969).
57. Id at 421.
58. While the court did not address the voluntary issue directly in its dpinion, the fact
situation, together with Justice Robertson's vigorous dissent lead to the conclusion that the
court did consider and reject the voluntary argument. Id at 418-28 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
59. For an in-depth analysis of the legal and social policy justification for shifting a
greater burden to the employer, see Spencer, The Developing Notion of Employer Responsibility
for the Alcoholic, Drug-Addicted or Mentally Ill Employee- An Examination Under Federal &
State Employment Statutes d Arbitration Decision, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 659 (1979).

B. Social Security Disability Benefits
The definition of disability under the insurance provisions of

the Social Security Act 6o rests on three criteria: (1)a medically determinable physical or mental impairment; (2) the impairment has continued or can be expected to continue for a period of at least twelve

months; and (3) the impairment creates an inability to engage in any
substantially gainful activity. 6' This definition is restrictive and has

been applied in a restrictive manner by the Social Security Administration.6 2 Eligibility for benefits is limited by regulations that require a high degree of medical proof.63 In addition, "any
substantially gainful activity"' has been construed broadly. Finally,
the gainful activity need not be available in an area proximate to the
claimant, but may merely "exist in the national economy. ' 65 The
definition limits eligibility because the purpose of Social Security is
to provide income maintenance only to those who are excluded from
the economy because of age or physical condition.66 Although the
system is designed to provide incapacitated individuals with "a right
to share in consumption when not working," it does not lose sight of

the fact that "a job is the most important part of income security.

67

By closely associating disability with the ability to work, the definition implements the social policy of maintaining those who are incapable of work, while providing incentive to work to those with the

capacity.
Within this narrowly drafted definition, the treatment afforded
obesity, alcoholism, 6 and drug addiction is somewhat unexpected.
For example, while acknowledging that alcoholism could render an
60. Social Security Act of 1935, tit. II, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-418, 420-423, 424a431 (1976).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(A) (1976).
62. The statute further defines physical or mental impairments as "[Aln impairment that
results from anatomical, physiological or psychological conditions which are demonstrable by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory techniques," 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3) (1976). Further, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526 (1980) states that the conclusion of non-social security administration physician is not determinative and must be supported by "specific and complete clinical
findings." Id
63. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1504, 404.1513, 404.1516, 404.1524-.1527, app. I at 356 (1980)
(standards for medical determination of disability).
64. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505-.1508, 404.1510-.1513 (1980) (methods of assessing an applicant's vocational possibilities in the job market).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1976) (emphasis added.) The regulations add that even if
the individual cannot find work because of employer's hiring practices, he cannot receive benefits, if he is capable of working at all. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509(b) (1980). Thus, if disability had
the same definition under fair employment laws, not only would the individual be ineligible
for Social Security benefits, he would also not be protected from the very hiring practices that
made him so unemployable that he requires some form of income maintenance.
66. See R. BALL, SOCIAL SECURITY TODAY AND TOMORROW 3 (1978) (author is a former
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.)
67. Id
68. See Annot., 39 A.L.R. FED. 182 (1978) (discussing alcoholism under disability insurance law, 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1976).

individual incapable of working, one early decision69 denied benefits

by presuming that the failure to abstain from liquor was a voluntary
failure to follow treatment. 70 Another early decision granted benefits where the physical manifestations of the alcoholism, but not the
alcoholism itself, became irreversible. 7' The modern view however
is that when the condition has so advanced that the individual cannot work, both the condition itself and the failure to abstain are presumed to be involuntary.72 The modem result is, in fact, consistent
with the underlying purpose of social security. 3 If the policy of so-

cial security is identifying and maintaining those physically incapable of working, then the cause of their incapacity should be
irrelevant.
A similar analysis has been applied to obesity under the Social

Security disability definition. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit 74 reasoned that "obesity is a consideration not for rejecting
disability benefits, but in explaining why employment . . . is not
available. While I agree no one should eat their way onto the Social
Security rolls, such an object would hardly have led this applicant to
carry 325 pounds into 30 inch coal mines for 25 years."7 5 The Fifth
Circuit, 76 addressing the same issue added, "[C]ommon sense and
personal experience tells us how physically and emotionally difficult
it is to maintain an exercise program and a daily diet of 1500 calories
without medical supervision. ' ' 77 Both courts viewed massive obesity
as an involuntary condition.
The alcoholism and obesity decisions do not signal an end to the
voluntary/involuntary distinction. They indicate, instead, a willingness to accept a medical rather than a moral judgment of when an
act is volitional 7s -a reasonable result in light of the perceived pur69. Osborne v. Cohen, 409 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1969).
70. The decision implemented a regulation that states "[one] ... [w]ho will fully fail to
follow . . . prescribed treatment, cannot by virtue of such failure, be found to be under a
disability." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1518 (1980).
71. Lewis v. Celebrezze, 359 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1966) (irremedial liver damage found).
Although strictly conforming to the failure-to-remedy regulation (see note 70 supra), this
approach has the effect of encouraging alcoholism by denying benefits to all but those whose
alcohol consumption has ravaged their bodies. If the overriding policy consideration is the
discouragement of drinking, then no alcoholic should be allowed benefits. If the overriding
policy is to provide maintenance for the disabled, then benefits should be allowed to any alcoholic incapable of working. The tying of benefits to actual physical damage may alleviate a
problem of proof, but it neither discourages drinking nor provides treatment to the unfortunate
individual.
72. See Adams v. Weinberger, 548 F.2d 239 (8th Cir. 1977).
73. The alcoholic must pass the same eligibility requirements as any other disabled individual. See notes 62-69 and accompanying text supra The concern in this analysis is access of
the class to the program, not inclusion of a particular individual within the designated class.
74. Mefford v. Gardner, 383 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1967).
75. Id at 761.
76. Coulter v. Ingram Pipeline, Inc., 511 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1975).
77. Id at 738.
78. "[If
the alcoholism) progresses to the point where there is recognizable mental or

pose of Social Security. Whether the purpose of anti-discrimination
laws requires adoption of the medical definition awaits further analysis, but in the Social Security context alcoholism and obesity are
regarded as diseases to be treated, not vices to be punished.
C. Vocational Rehabilitation
1. Eligibility for Vocational Rehabilitation Programs.-Congress enacted the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 197379 to enable
handicapped individuals to live independently by becoming "completely integrated into normal community living and service patterns."8 ° The law was spurred by an express finding that the benefits
and fundamental rights of our society were often denied to the handicapped, such that the challenges and problems of their conditions
fell primarily on the handicapped individual or his family. 8' To
shift this burden Congress generously funded82 state rehabilitation
programs 83 assuring that the Vocational Rehabilitation Act would

expand services at the local level. Individual eligibility for these programs8 4 is determined by two criteria: first, the individual must have
a "physical or mental disability which for that individual constitutes
or results in a substantial handicap to employment"; 85 and second,
the individual "can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of
employability from vocation rehabilitation services." 8 6 In practice,
the threshold for individual qualification is low 8 7 since the state, in
every case, has the burden of stating
physical deterioration, moral values should not prevent a finding of. . .disability." Wyper v.
Providence Ins. Co., 533 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1976) (applying Social Security definitions to
private disability insurance) (emphasis added).
A medical definition of voluntary may be equated with the legal definition of voluntary
only where the policies served by both are substantially similar. By adopting the medical
standard for defining when a condition is voluntarily caused or maintained, the courts are
implicitly stating that treatment of these conditions is of greater value to society than moral
condemnation.
79. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976) as amended by Comprehensive Rehabilitation Service
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955.
80. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1976).
81. White House Conference on Handicapped Individuals Act, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 301,
88 Stat. 1631 (1974).
82. Congress has authorized appropriations totalling more than three billion dollars for
rehabilitation services. Comprehensive Rehabilitation Service Amendments of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-602, § 105(b), 92 Stat. 2955, amending 29 U.S.C. § 720 (1976).
83. An 80% federal contribution to state programs is authorized in 29 U.S.C. § 707
(1976).
84. State programs desiring federal funding are required to meet standards set by the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. 28 U.S.C. § 721 (1976).
85. Comprehensive Rehabilitation Services Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602,
§ 122, 92 Stat. 2955 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 706 (7)(A)(i) (Supp. 1980)).
86. Comprehensive Rehabilitation Services Amendments of 1978, Pub, L. No. 95-602,
§ 122, 92 Stat. 2955 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 706 (7)(A)(ii) (Supp. 1980)).
87. The Vocational Rehabilitation Act allows payment to the states for up to 18 months
for the provision of services for the purpose of determining if an applicant is, in fact, a handicapped individual. 29 U.S.C. § 706(4)(G)(i) (1976).

[the] reasons for an ineligibility determination [showing] that the
preliminary diagnosis [of the condition] or evaluation of rehabilitation potential has demonstrated beyond a reasonabledoubt [that
the individual is incapable of benefitting from vocational rehabilitation].,8

The purpose of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act is integration of
the handicapped into society; the standards defining the group are
inclusive. If the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act is also designed
to achieve economic integration, then the term handicapped should
be defined expansively in that context as well. 89
Alcohol and drug rehabilitation programs9" have been funded
under the Federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 9 1 The
Pennsylvania General Assembly allocates funds to the programs
through the Governor's Council on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse.9 2
The Pennsylvania statutory eligibility criteria9 3 and the Council's administrative standards are as inclusive as the federal eligibility criteria 94 despite the supposed voluntary nature of the conditions. The
federal government adopted a medical rather than moral definition
in the context of Social Security law. The Pennsylvania Legislature
has likewise accepted the medical standard by defining alcohol and
drug dependency in a matter that promotes, rather than withholds,
treatment.
88. 29 U.S.C. § 722(c)(2) (1976) (emphasis added).
89. See notes 112-117 and accompanying text infra (integrating minorities as a basis for
enactment of the PHRA).
90. Rehabilitation programs for the massively obese, however, have not been funded in
Pennsylvania. The policy of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation is that
while obesity may be a substantial handicap to employment, present medical treatment cannot
be reasonably expected to benefit the afflicted individual. PA. BUREAU OF VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION, MANUAL OF PROCEDURES, Disability Guidelines, § 407.05 (1980). The absence

of weight control programs suggests that obesity is distinguishable from alcoholism and drug
abuse. The manner in which these conditions may be distinguished and the relevancy of that
distinction to fair employment law will be discussed in detail in the text accompanying notes
169-172 infra.
91. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976) as amended by Comprehensive Rehabilitation Services
Amendment of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955.
92. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1690.103(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). Pennsylvania has had
alcoholic treatment programs since at least 1953; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 2101 (Purdon 1969)
(repealed 1972), and drug addiction treatment since at least 1952, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50,
§ 2062 (Purdon 1969) (repealed 1972).
93. To be eligible for treatment one must be:
A person who is using a drug, controlled substance or alcohol and is in a state of
psychic or physical dependence . . . characterized by . . . responses that include a

strong compulsion to take drugs [or] alcohol on a continuous basis to explain its
psychic effects.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1690.102(b) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81 (emphasis added).
94.

GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE, GENERAL STANDARDS FOR

TREATMENT ACTIVITIES § 262.6 (1979) is similar to the individual plans required under the

federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 722 (1976). These plans inherently eliminate stereotypical assumptions about alcoholics and drug abusers by making eligibility primarily a medical decision. See notes 85-88 and accompanying text supra

2. Section 504." The Equal Employment Opportunity Provision of the RehabilitationAct of 1973. -The Rehabilitation Act of
1973 aims to restore the individual's ability to work so that he may
be fully integrated into the economy.96 Because Congress allocated
enormous resources 97 to provide incapacitated individuals with the

skills necessary to earn a living, it would have been illogical for Congress to allow an employer to arbitrarily deny rehabilitated individuals the opportunity to use those skills. Congress, therefore,
incorporated an anti-discrimination provision into the Vocational
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 504.98
To effectuate the anti-discrimination protection provision of
Section 504, Congress drafted a definition of handicapped that was
even more inclusive than the already broad standard used to define
eligibility for treatment. 99 Despite the expansive definition in Section 504, and the fact that alcohol and drug users were already eligible for rehabilitation treatment, coverage of these conditions under
Section 504 was disputed.'0°
The first court' 0 ' to address the issue concluded that a drug user
in a methadone treatment program was within the handicap classification outlined under Section 504. The court held:
The conclusion that Congress intended to include past drug users
within the protection of the [Vocational Rehabilitation] Act is reasonable as matters of public policy ....

It is not surprising that

Congress would provide assistance for those who have overcome
their addiction and give support and incentive to those who are
attempting to overcome it. . . . I, therefore, conclude that persons
with histories of drug use, including present participation in...
95. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, tit. V, § 504, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976)).
96. See note 81 supra.
97. See note 82 supra.
98. No otherwise qualified handicapped individual within the United States as defined in Section 706 [29 U.S.C. § 706 (b)] shall, solely, by reason of his handicap be
excluded from. . . or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal Financial Assistance.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). While this section does not explicitly operate against employment
discrimination, nor authorize a private action for its violation, it has been construed as authorizing both. See 44 A.L.R. FED. 149 (1979).
99. 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (1976) states:
For the purposes of Title V [including Section 504].. . [a handicapped individual]
means any person who has (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life functions, (B) Has a record of such impairments or (C)
is regarded as having such impairments.
This is more expansive than the handicapped definition used to determine treatment eligibility
because it not only encompasses those who presently have an impairment, but also those having had an impairment or are merely perceived as having an impairment. See notes 87-88
supra. See also notes 132-146 and accompanying text infra, for a detailed analysis of the
consequences of this definition.
100. See Spencer, The Developing Notion of Employer Responsibility for the Alcoholic,
Drug-Addicted or Mentally III Employee: An Examination Under Federal& State Employment
Statutes & Arbitration Decisions, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 659, 670 n.38 (1979).
101. Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978).

programs are handicapped
0 2 within the meaning of the statutory
and regulatory language. 1
In 1978 Congress affirmed the court's decision when it amended
the Vocational Rehabilitation Act to read: "For the purposes of Section 504 [29 U.S.C. § 794] as such sections relate to employment,
such term [handicapped] does not include any individual whose current use [of drugs or alcohol]. . . prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job in question. . .or constitute[s] a direct
threat to property or the safety of others."' 0 3 Although ambiguous
on its face, the legislative history of the amendment indicates that
Section 504 coverage extends to all alcohol and drug abusers, except
those who are, in fact, unable to perform job requirements. I'I
Section 504 is the federal analog to the Pennsylvania Human
Relations handicap coverage.'05 Pennsylvania legislators were
aware when they amended the Human Relations Act to include the
handicapped that Section 504 applied to federal-state joint programs
under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act.'0 6 Unless the policy of the
Human Relations Act differs significantly from that of the federal
Vocational Rehabilitation Act, a similar definition of handicapped,
including voluntary conditions, would be appropriate to the PHRA.
It would be an effective means to protect the investment the legislature has made in rehabilitating Pennsylvania citizens. 0 7 Indeed in
the total scheme of providing for the disabled, Social Security maintains those who cannot work; rehabilitation programs enable them to
compete for work; fair employment laws should therefore, assure
that the competition for jobs is fairly conducted.
IV.

Pennsylvania Human Relations Act

While consistency within the broad area of the law serving the
handicapped is desirable, and principles gathered from related law
102. Id at 796.
103. Comprehensive Rehabilitation Services Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602,
§ 122, 92 Stat. 2955 (codified in 29 U.S.C.A. § 706 (7)(B) (Supp. 1980).
104. "The conference substitute clarifies that only those active alcoholics or drug abusers
who also cannot perform. . . [on] the job ... or present a danger to life or property, are not
covered by the employment provisions of ... § 504." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1780, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 102, reprintedin [19781 U.S. CODE CONrG. & AD. NEWS 7334, 7413.
105. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
106. The Pa. Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation receives 80% of its funding from the
federal government under the provisions of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 722
(1976).
107. Arguably the legislature has already authorized the application of the Pa. Human
Relations Act to the voluntary conditions of drug and alcohol abuse. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7 1,
§ 1690.110 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81), states "Drug and alcohol abuse or dependence shall be
regarded as a. .. physical and mental illness, disease, disability or similarterm for the purpose
of all legislation relating to health, welfare and rehabilitation programs, funds and other benefits." Id (emphasis added). It is reasonable to see the PHRA as a welfare benefit under the
obviously broad intent of this section. Thus, alcoholism and drug dependence can be regarded
as disabilities under the Act.

are persuasive, only an examination of the purpose of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act itself can determine the definition
most appropriate to the Act. 08 Thus, the relevant language, legislative history, and judicial interpretation of the Act must be explored.
4.

Statutory Language and Legislative History.

Section 952(b) of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act' 0 9
provides:
It is hereby declared the public policy of this Commonwealth to
foster the employment of all individuals in accordance with their
fullest capacities regardless of their race, color, religious creed, ancestry, handicap or disability ...

age, sex, or national origin."

This declaration contains two separate and possibly conflicting
purposes. The stated aim of the law is to utilize all individual capacities, yet the Act designates only specified classifications, such as
race, color, and religion, as impermissible. The Act, in fact, only
provides enforcement measures to protect these designated classes. IIt
In effect, the PHRA enunciates a policy of utilizing the capacities of
the entire workforce, but applies that policy only to specific groups
within the workforce.
The history of the Act explains this apparent anomaly. Fair employment laws were enacted during a period of a burgeoning political movement to integrate Blacks and other racial minorities into the
mainstream of American life.t2 Conscious of minority aspirations,
proponents of the original PHRA legislation" 13 urged its passage by
citing the findings of the Governor's Commission on Industrial Race
Relations that minorities were under-employed.' ' They spoke of
108. See I PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 1921 (Purdon 1980-81). This cannon of statutory construction reflects the central theme of the comment; that proper attribution of meaning depends on a thorough understanding of an Act's underlying social policy. See notes 16-30 and
accompanying text supra.
109. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 952(b) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
110. Id
111. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(a)-(j) (Purdon Supp. 1980-8 1) which lists twentyfive separate categories of illegal discriminatory acts. All, however, are only illegal when done
on the basis of race, color, religious creed, ancestry, sex national or handicapped/disability.
112. President Johnson's speech to Congress urging adoption of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, typifies the tenor of the times:
Last week I addressed to the American people an appeal to conscience. A request for
their cooperation in meeting the moral crisis in America race relations. I warned of a
rising tide of discontent that threatens the public safety in many parts of the country.
I emphasized that the events in Birmingham and elsewhere have so increased the
cries for equality that no city or state or legislative body can prudently choose to
ignore them. It is time to act in Congress, in State and local legislative bodies and
above all, in all of our daily lives.
Special message to the Congress by the President, June 19, 1963, reprinted in 2 STATUTORY
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 1055 (1970).
113. Act of Oct. 27, 1955, Pa. Laws 744 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-963
(Purdon 1964)).
114. 3 PA. LEG. J. 2827 (1955) (Remarks of Pa. State Sen. Silbert).

the bill as promoting "brotherhood"l"5 and correcting "evils born in
slavery. '16
Although the Act surely was intended to elevate the status of
minorities" 7 this concern alone does not explain its ultimate passage.
The legislature also saw PHRA as an affirmance of fundamental
American values." 8 The belief that individual effort is the -main
driving force behind progress is a basic tenent of American society.
The arbitrary denial of "a fair opportunity and a free scope for individual effort" on the basis of unfounded, stereotypical assumptions
runs completely counter to basic principles of the American system.'' 9
The evil to be remedied by the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Act is not simply the economic deprivation of minorities but more
fundamentally, the affront arbitrary discrimination presents to society's deeply felt values of fair play and individual merit. 2 0 "[Fairemployment laws] reflect a rejection of any point of view of innate
inferiority and also a commitment to the principle that competition
for scarce opportunities' 2 ' should be on the basis of individual
115. 1 PA. LEG. J. 446 (1955) (Remarks of Pa. State Rep. Varallo).
116. 3 PA. LEG. J. 2825 (1955) (Remarks of Pa. State Sen. Dent).
117. 3 PA. LEG. J. 2826 (1955) (Remarks of Pa. State Sen. Holland).
118. I was motivated by what I . . . believe to be the fundamental rights of Americans and the rights contained in our Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States. People of all religions and all creeds and all colors only
seek the same gbal. An opportunity to work and rear their families, an opportunity
to give their children a little better lot in life, a roof over their heads, food sufficient to
keep their bellies warm and full and a little set aside for a time in old age when they
are unable to care for themselves.
3 PA. LEG. J. 2826 (1955) (Remarks of Pa. State Sen. Dent).
119.

G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DE-

MOCRACY 211 (1944). Gunnan Myrdal's famous study of the conflict between America's selfperception as a free and classless society and the role society had relegated to Negro proved
prophetic. It predicted not only the explosion of the Black political movement, but also why
that movement would be successful. Myrdal understood that Americans could not passively
accept the notion that a group could be denied access to society once that exclusion was seen as
an unfair restraint on the individual. Id
A stronger statement of the role the perception of individual merit plays in societal structure is made in M. YOUNG, THE RISE OF THE MERITOCRACY:

1870-2033 (1958), in which the

author theorizes that since 1870 the rich have satisfactorily justified their position to the poor
by documents (such as diplomas, degress, doctorates) showing superior individual merit. If
such a theory is true, it certainly would be difficult for the rich to deny the poor a fair chance to
prove their individual merit. In any case the concept of individual merit deserving a fair opportunity is not a liberal propaganist's theory, but one of the fundamental assumptions of our
society.
120. Whether you be [sic] Black or White, Catholic, Protestant or Jew, or what your
national ancestry may be, you will be denied the equal rights to seek employment
and certainly, Mr. Speaker, that is not the American way.
I PA. LEG. J. 433 (1955) (Remarks of Pa. State Rep. Rigby).
121. Unemployment in America has not gone below 4% since 1964, and indeed, 4% is
presently considered to be an unattainable goal. Full employment is presently considered to
have been obtained when the unemployment rate reaches 5.5% P. CAGAN, The Reduction of
Inflation and the Magnitude of Unemployment in CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC PROBLEMS (W.

Fellner ed. 1977). The unemployment rate from Jan. 1977 thru May 1980 averaged 6.5%,
WORLD ALMANAC 177 (1981). Under economic conditions where many individuals remain
unemployed, the allocation ofjob opportunities is a crucial social issue. Fair employment laws

merit." 122
The PHRA clearly commits Pennsylvania to the broad goal of
utilizing every individual's capacities. The extent and legal effect of
the commitment is, however, somewhat ambiguous. Judicial use of
the policy declaration in Section 952 helps to clarify the ambiguity.
B. JudicialInterpretation
Pennsylvania courts have viewed the Pennsylvania Human Relatins Act as a "manifestation of a fundamental policy of the Commonwealth." 23 Consequently, the general policy declarations of the
Act have played a significant role in construing the Act's jurisdiction.
In PennsylvaniaHuman Relations Comm'n v. Chester School District, 24 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected a lower court's
holding that since "the underlying inequities. . . expounded in the
declaration of policy [Section 952 [did) not include defacto segregation as such," defacto segregation was not prohibited by the Act.' 2
The Supreme Court stated that the "restrictive. construction placed
on this section [the policy provisions of Section 952]" . . . by the
lower court, "[i]gnores the legislative intention that racial discrimination, whatever the source threatens the health, safety and welfare
of the Commonwealth."' 26 Thus, the Court accepted PHRC jurisdiction over this class of discriminatory action by giving legal effect
to the general policy provisions.
The willingness of courts to see the policy sections of the Act as
requiring broad jurisdiction reached its apex in Mars Community
Boys' BaseballAssociation v. PennsylvaniaHuman Relations Commission. 127 In that case, a girl requested relief because she had been
denied access to membership in the boys' baseball league. Looking
at the PHRA the court discovered that the literal statutory language
prohibited discrimination in places of public accommodation "because of race, color, religious creed, ancestry, or national origin," 2 '
but made no mention of sex discrimination. Nonetheless, despite the
complete absence of even ambiguous language, one-half of the court
held that Section 952 and other general policy declarations in the
are a means to guarantee that jobs are allocated by criteria society, rather than the individual
employer, deems to be fair.
122. Fiss, A Theory of FairEmployment Law, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 241 (1971).
123. Pennsylvania Human Rel. Comm'n v. Chester School Dist., 427 Pa. 157, 167, 233
A.2d 290, 295 (1967).
124. 427 Pa. 157, 233 A.2d 290 (1967).
125. Id at 169, 233 A.2d at 296, citing Chester School Dist. v. Pennsylvania Human Rel.
Comm'n, 85 Dauph. 18, 28, 224 A.2d 811, 822 (1966).
126. Id at 170, 233 A.2d at 297.
127.
- Pa. - 410 A.2d 1246 (1980).
128. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(i) (Purdon 1964).

Act were sufficient, by themselves, to require a prohibition of sex discrimination be included in the public accommodations provisions.
Pennsylvania courts have also interpreted Section 952 as mandating a broad reading both of the class of discriminators reached by
the Act 129 and the class of actions deemed discriminatory under the
Act.' 3 ° It, therefore, would be consistent to see the Act's strong social policy as dictating an expansive definition of the class of handicapped individuals to be protected.
V.

The Handicap Provisions of the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act

A.

The PHRC Definition of the Handicapped
It shall be an unlawfully discriminatory practice, unless based
upon a bonafide occupational qualification,. . . for any employer
because of.

.

. the non-job related handicaps or disability of any

individual to refuse to hire or employ, to bar or to discharge from
employment ...

or to discriminate against such individual with

respect to compensation, hire, tenure, conditions or privileges of
employment.... 13!
Under the statutory procedures established by the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act, the handicap provisions are initially interpreted by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. 32 The
Commission has adopted verbatim the definition of handicapped applicable to the equal employment provisions [Section 504] of the
Federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973.133 The Courts accord "substantial weight" to the interpretations of the Act by the
PHRC. 134 The specific PHRC decisions, however, regarding handi129. Alto-Reste Cemetery Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Human Rel. Comm'n, 453 Pa. 124, 306
A.2d 881 (1973) (non-sectarian cemetery held to be public accommodations subject to the Act's
jurisdiction).
130. Pennsylvania Human Rel. Comm'n v. Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge No. 107, 448 Pa.
451, 294 A.2d 594 (1972) (private club's dining room was construed as a public accommodation when members invite non-members to use the facilities).
131. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). While this comment deals
exclusively with the employment protection granted the handicapped, other protections are
included in the Act. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(c) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81) protecting
union membership); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(f) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81) (prohibition of
discrimination by employment agencies); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(h) (Purdon Supp. 198081) (protection from housing discrimination); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(i) (Purdon Supp.
1980-81) (prohibiting discrimination in places of public accommodation, including schools).
132. The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission was established "to adopt, promulgate, amend and rescind rules and regulations to effectuate the policies and provisions of this
Act," PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 957(d) (Purdon 1964), and to "initiate, receive, investigate and
pass upon complaints charging unlawful discriminatory practices," PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 957(f) (Purdon 1964). The Act requires that a complainant requesting relief from a discriminatory practice first exhaust the administrative remedies before the Commission prior to pursuing the issue in the judicial system. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
The Commission, through its regulations and adjudicative hearings, gives legal substance to
the statutory framework.
133. 29 U.S.C. §§ 706(6) (A)-706(6)(C) (1976). See note 99 supra.
134. Because the statute intends that the Commission play an adjudicative, as well as in-
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cap classifications are bound by the legislative intent.
The PHRC definition of handicapped is tripartate, each section
having an independent legal effect. 16 Pa. Code § 44.4(i)(A) defines

handicap as "a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits a major life function."' 3 6 Section 44.4(i)(A) is neutral, in that
the judicial interpretation of "substantial limit[ation]" and "major
life function" may be inclusive or restrictive. 137 16 Pa. Code
§ 44.4(i)(B), on the other hand, permits retroactive application of the

handicap classification. "A handicapped individual is one who has a
record of such an impairment [one qualified under Section 44.4
(i)[A)].' 138 Under Section 44.4(i)(B) an individual not presently
under any physical impairment could, nonetheless, be protected. Although the appropriateness of protecting past physical impairments
may be challenged,' 39 the statutory language is unequivocal. Section
955(b)(5) states: "It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice
. . . for any employer to.40 . . deny employment because of a prior
'
handicap or disability."'
Sections 44.4(i)(A) and (B) are inherently limited in scope, since
the existence of a handicap, either past or present, can be determined
by ascertainable physical characteristics. 16 Pa. Code § 44.4(i)(C) is
different in kind and expansive in effect. Section 44.4(i)(C) states:
"A handicapped individual is one who is regardedas having such an
impairment [that substantially limits a major life function]." 4 ' The
vestigative role, the decisions and regulations of the PHRC are given "substantial weight" by
the courts. See Brief for Respondents at 16, Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Pennsylvania Human
Rel. Comm'n. (English), No. 1033 C.D. 1980 (Pa. Commw. Ct. petition for review filed April
25, 1980), citing Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency v. Abington Mem. Hosp.,
478 Pa. 514, 387 A.2d 440 (1978).
135. See Pennsylvania Human Rel. Comm'n v. St. Joe Minerals Corp., 24 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 455, 357 A.2d 233 (1976).
136. 16 PA. CODE § 44.4(i)(A) (1979).
137. The Commission has, however, interpreted subsection (A) broadly:
Physical or mental impairment means a physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following symptoms:
neurological; musculoskelatal; special sense organs; respiratory including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genito-urinary; hemic and lymphetic;
skin and endocrine or mental or psychological disorder such as mental illness, and
specific leaming disabilities.
16 PA. CODE § 44.4(ii)(A) (1979). In addition, Subsection (B) provides: "Major life activities
means functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working." 16 PA. CODE § 44.4 (ii)(B) (1979).
138. 16 PA. CODE § 44.4(i)(B) (1979).
139. Brief for the Petitioner at 22, Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Pennsylvania Human Rel.
Comm'n. (English), No. 1033 C.D. 1980 (Pa. Commw. Ct. petition for review filed April 25,
1980).
140. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(b)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). By adopting the language the legislature is implicitly recognizing that rehabilitation of the handicapped makes no
sense if the rehabilitated individual can arbitrarily be denied employment. See notes 95-99
and accompanying text supra. Nor did the legislature intend employer presumptions of future
handicaps to be permissible since it declared "Uninsurability or increased cost of insurance
...does not render a handicap or disability job related." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(p)
(Purdon Supp. 1980-81) (only non-job related handicaps are protected by the PHRA).
141. 16 PA. CODE § 44.4(i)(C) (1979).

protection afforded the individual regarded as handicapped is not
triggered by the employee's actual physical characteristics, but by
the employer's reaction to the physical characteristics. 4 2 Thus, the
asthmatic or mild epileptic is protected not because his inherent condition actually impairs a life function, but because the employer assumes that it does.
Nonetheless, in adopting the "regarded as handicapped' provision, the PHRC is in harmony with Pennsylvania courts in construing the Act's jurisdiction broadly to effectuate its underlying
policy.' 43 The PHRA does not protect Blacks because of their
"blackness" per se, but because employers react to blackness by discriminating against Black workers. It is no less consistent with the
Act's purpose to protect individuals regarded as handicapped than it
is to protect individuals regarded as Black.44 By requiring that an
employer verify an employee's incapacity, rather than merely regarding the employee as incapable, the PHRC definition "[flosters employment of all individuals in accordance with their fullest
capacities." 45 Fair Employment law inherently looks to the employer's reaction to an individual's characteristics, not the characteristics themselves. "The principle of non-discrimination requires that
individuals be considered on the basis of individual capacity and not
on the basis of any characteristics generally attributable to the
group."

46

Further support for the PHRC definition can be found in the
specific provisions of the Act. Section 955(b)(1) 1'7 allows the employer to inquire as to "the existence and nature of apresent handicap or disability," but also states that "to decide whether such a
handicap or disability substantially interferes with the ability to perform the essential functions of the Uob] . . .the employer must in-.
142. Advocates for the Handicapped v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 67 I11.App. 3d 512, 385
N.E.2d 39 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979), and Providence Journal Co. v. Mason, 116
R.I. 614, 359 A.2d 682 (1976) have adopted classifications defining the handicap class by criteria based strictly on the actual physical condition of the individual, thus rejecting constructions
that would allow an employer's actions to determine the existence of a handicap as an over
extention of the law. See notes 25-28, 30 and accompanying text supra. For analysis of the
validity of the restrictive view, see notes 142-159 and accompanying text infra.
143. See notes 123-130 and accompanying text supra.
144. It is peculiar that the spector of over-inclusive class is raised only in the context of the
handicapped. If one was regarded as being Black - treated as a Black man - thus being
denied employment or housing or the right to vote, would the discriminator later be able to
claim that the person was not actually Black and therefore escape liability? See J. GRFIN,
BLACK LIKE ME, (1961) (account of a white man who, having darkened his skin, travelled
through the segregated South).
145. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 952(b) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
146. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rel., 4 Pa. Commw. Ct. 448,
lf'd 413 U.S. 376 (1973) citing Weeks v. Southern Bell Tele465, 287 A.2d 161, 170 (1972),
phone & Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1969).
147. 9 PA. STAT, ANN. tit. 43, § 955(b)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).

quire beyond the mere existence of a handicap."' 4 Consequently, to
comply with the Act, the employer is required to look beyond his
perception of the applicant's abilities and to consider the abilities
themselves. Section 955(1) indicates a legislative intent that the underlying principle of merit selection be applied to handicapped discrimination' 4 9 as it is to sexual, racial or religious discrimination.
The PHRC definition of handicapped comports with that intent.

B.

The Consequences of an Inclusive Definition

While the PHRC definition apparently is consistent with the
legislative intent of the Human Relations Act, it cannot stand if its
practical consequences lead to an unintended result. 5 0° Proponents
of a restrictive definition of "handicapped" contend that the practical consequences of the PHRC definition would be to unreasonably
limit the right of employers to choose their employees, for "[any]
person with any physical disability, no matter how slight, [would be]
entitled to protection under the Fair Employment Practices Act."' 5 1
The PHRC definition would, by such reasoning, have the unintended consequence of creating a universal anti-discrimination law.
Thus, the limits of the PHRC formulation, if any, must be examined.
To be considered "handicapped" under Section 44.4(i)(A) or
(B) 152 a complainant must provide medical proof to the Human Relations Commission 5 3 that he has, or has a record of, "an impairment that substantially limits a major life function."' 5 4 Certainly,
some conditions will fail to qualify.
Unlike limitations to Section 44.4(i)(A) and (B), which are express, the limitation of the Section 44.4(i)(C) "regarded as handicapped" class is inherent in the definition. The limitation becomes
apparent in examining the order of proof in employment discrimina148. Id
149. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(b)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81), in prohibiting discrimination based on past handicaps likewise aims to prevent the perception of the effects of a past
disability from being the decisive factor in an employment decision. PHRC regulations also
give employer's perceptions legal effect in construing "has a record of impairment" as meaning
"has a history or has been miclassfied as having a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life function." 16 PA. CODE § 44.4(ii)(C). See State Div. of
Human Rights v. Averill Parks Cent. School Dist., 46 N.Y.2d 950, 415 N.Y.S.2d 405, 388
N.E.2d 719 (1979) (a school bus driver's termination held to be discriminatory when the school
administered hearing test that incorrectly classified to the driver as deaf). The "misclassification" regulation differs from the "regarded as" handicapped regulation in that the employer's
decision is based on his negligent estimation of the employee's ability to perform job functions
rather than a stereotypical assumption of the employee's abilities. If the "misclassified" handicap class is appropriate for anti-discrimination law, then the "regarded as" class is appropriate
as well.
150. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(6) (Purdon 1980).
151. Providence Journal Co. v. Mason, 116 R.I. 614, 621, 359 A.2d 682 (1976).
152.

16 PA. CODE § 44.4(i)(A) & (B) (1979).

153. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1980-81) (outlining the procedures which must be followed to obtain relief under the PHRA).
154. 16 PA. CODE § 44.4(i) (A) (1979).

tion cases. In the landmark case of McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, '55
in which a Black worker was denied employment for which he was
proven to be qualified, the United States Supreme Court was willing
to infer solely from the fact of denial that race was the basis for the
job decision. The employer, therefore, had the burden of rebutting
the presumption of discriminatory intent. Under the "regarded as"
handicapped definition the inference of discriminatory intent cannot
be made, for if the complainant cannot prove that the physical impairment was the basis for the job decision, then he cannot claim
that the employer regarded-him as handicapped. The employee can
only establish a prima facie case of discrimination by evidence of a
causal relationship between the impairment and the adverse job decision. When the burden of going forward is on the complainant the
likely result is that claims will be limited by the difficulty of making
the necessary showing.' 56 Trivial and unfounded claims will be unable to bear the burden.
The burden of proof analysis reveals a more basic fallacy in the
restrictive approach to the handicap definition. A narrow classification assumes that the legislature intended to limit access to the class,
rather than to limit the law's effect on employer discretion. Examination of the statutory language leads to the opposite conclusion. A
non-job related handicap means "any handicap. . . which does not
substantially interfere with ability toperform the essential functions of
[employment].'" 5 7 Thus, the legislature appears willing to extend
protection to any handicap as long as it does not interfere with reasonable business needs. "Fair employment laws embody an attempt
to reconcile two distinct and, at times, competing social interests the interest in ending all vestiges of discrimination, and the interest
in promoting an efficient and productive economy."' 51 Under the
scheme of the PHRA, the interest in ending discrimination against
the handicapped is served by inclusive definition of the class. The
interest in promoting an efficient economy is promoted by the job
relatedness limitation.
Moreover, Social Security, Workmen's Compensation and Vocational Rehabilitation programs all define the disabled class primarily by the ability to work, rather than by the innate nature of the
155. 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (holding adopted in Pennsylvania in General Elec. Co. v. Pennsylvania Human Rel. Comm'n, 469 Pa. 292, 365 A.2d 649 (1976)).
156. PHRC statistics show that even with the McDonald-Douglas presumptions, more
than 65.0% of the complaints filed in 1979 were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, failure to
show probable cause, or failure of the complainant to pursue the complaint. Pennsylvania
Human Relations Commission, ANNUAL REPORT 10 (1980).
157. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(p) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
158. General Elec. Co. v. Pennsylvania Human Rel. Comm'n, 469 Pa. 292, 303, 365 A.2d
649, 655 (1976).

disability. 5 9 There is no distinction of purpose between the PHRA
and these other statutes that necessitates a different definition of disability under the Human Relations Act. Finally, since males as well
as females and whites as well as Blacks are protected by anti-discrimination law, the mere possibility of universal access alone does
not seem sufficient to justify restriction of a protected class.
The PHRC inclusive definition does not appear to place a
greater burden on the employer than the legislature intended. The
inherent limitations of the definition tend to minimize trivial and
unfounded claims, and the job-relatedness criteria will reduce employer discretion only to the extent that discretion serves no legitimate business purpose. The net effect of the PHRC definition is not
likely to create a "universal fair employment law" but merely to
stimulate businessmen to more carefully tailor physical employment
criteria to the job itself.
VI.

Volition under an Inclusive Definition of Handicapped

In one sense, adoption of the PHRC definition would be determinative in the English 6 case. Philadelphia Electric's testing indicated that Joyce English was capable of performing the job, but
PECO denied her the position because of her obesity. Since PECO
regarded Ms. English as handicapped, she would be protected under
16 Pa. Code 44.4(i)(C). Nonetheless, the countervailing question of
the voluntary nature of the condition may serve to exclude obesity
from even the broadest handicap classification.
The fact that a characteristic is voluntarily chosen does not, per
se exclude it from fair employment law protection. The voluntary
choice of religion is expressly protected.' 6' In United Airlines v.
Sprogis, 162 litigated under the federal analog 6 3 of the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act, the voluntary choice to be married was protected. On the other hand, Fagan v. National Cash Register, "6 did
not find the voluntary choice of hair length to be protected. While
both characteristics were equally voluntary, the opinions are consistent because marriage is considered a fundamental value, while hair
159. See notes 105-107 and accompanying text supra.
160. English v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., No. E-12163, op. at 9-10 (Pa. Human Rel.
Comm'n. March 31, 1980). The use of the Metropolitan Life tables neither considered Ms.
English's personal health nor did it show her to be incapable of performing her job functions.
This is not the type of merit selection indicated by the Act.
161. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
162. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1971) (policy that required
termination of married female employees, but allowed married males to continue working
held discriminatory on basis of sex).
163. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)).
164. 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (policy that terminated males with long hair, but
allowed females with long hair to continue working held not to be discriminatory on basis of
sex).

length is not. But if fair employment law does not afford the choice
of personal appearance protection, it would appear inconsistent to
protect the choice of overeating, overdrinking or over-indulgening in
drugs.
The answer lies in understanding the legislative intent embodied in Workmen's Compensation, Social Security or Vocational Rehabilitation statutes. These laws did not abolish the distinction
between voluntary and involuntary conditions, but rather changed
the standard by which a given condition is judged to be volitional
Adoption of medical criteria in these areas of the law implicitly reflects a societal judgment that alcoholism, drug use, and obesity
should be subject to a standard of psychological dependence, not to a
moral standard of undesirability. The choice of hair length is distinguishable because under either standard it is indisputably a free
choice, while alcoholism, drug use, or obesity per se are not volitional under present medical criteria.
Social Security benefits and Vocational Rehabilitation programs are available to alcoholics and drug abusers who meet applicable medical standards.'6 5 The Pennsylvania legislature explicitly
adopted a "psychological dependence" standard' 6 6 in fashioning rehabilitation programs for drug and alcohol abuse. Federal anti-discrimination protections have been extended to alcohol and drug
abusers. Courts that have considered obesity in the Social Security
context have medical standards to determine volition. Under a medical standard overeating is no more volitional than overdrinking. 6 7
Employing a medical standard to determine the voluntary nature of
alcoholism, obesity and drug abuse under the Human Relations Act
would reflect the change in societal attitude toward these conditions
16 8
as well as comport with essentially remedial policies of the Act.
This analysis can be taken one step further. In Workmen's
165. See notes 69-78, 91-95 and accompanying text supra.
166. See notes 99-104 and accompanying text supra.
167. Prominent nutritionist Dr. Jean Mayer points out:
Considering obesity to be caused by 'over-eating' is like considering alcoholism to be
caused by 'overdrinking' . . . it is probable that considering the complication of
physiologic and phychologic mechanisms involved [that] one will find not a single
cause but a multiplicity of factors leading to this caloric imbalance.
J. MAYER, OVERWEIGHT: CAUSES, COSTS AND CONTROL 3 (1968). A study conducted in Bos-

ton divided 400 obese individuals into four groups, three receiving extensive medical and
phychological therapy over a period of three years. The treated individuals lost no more
weight than the untreated. The vast majority in all groups remained obese. The study indicates losing weight may not be a simple matter of individual volition. J. MAYER, OBESITY:
CAUSES, COST AND CONTROL 62 (1968).

168. The distinction between the moral standard and the medical standard is starkly outlined in the criminal context.
Psychology is concerned with diagnosis and treatment, not moral judgment. * * * *
[T]o the psychiatrist mental cases are a series of imperceptible gradations from mild
psychosis to the extreme phychotic, where criminal law allows no gradation. It requires a final moral judgment of the culpability of the accused. . . . A complete
reconciliation of the medical test and moral test of criminal responsibility is impossi-

Compensation, the societal interest in shifting the burden of workrelated injuries to the employer so outweighs the interest in punishing alcoholism or obesity that the voluntary issue is completely irrelevant to employer liability. 6 9 Similarly, since the explicit policy of
the Human Relations Act is to foster maximum utilization of "all
individuals in accordance with their fullest capabilities," 7 0 considerations of the voluntariness in a condition are irrelevant. A closer
look at the Fagan decision shows that firing the long-haired males
was affirmed not because of voluntariness, but because the court
found that the long hair detracted from the individual's appearance
in a way that made him unable to perform the job functions. 7 ' The
exception to the handicapped class should be drawn on the basis of
job-relatedness, not on voluntariness.
VII.

Conclusion

The inclusion of voluntary conditions within the handicapped
classification of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act is ultimately
a question of access to the Act's protections, not a guarantee of employment. The policy of fostering the use of individual capacities
that permeates the PHRA's language, history and judicial construction indicates a legislative intent that the access be broad. The treatment of obesity, alcoholism, and drug abuse as handicaps in related
areas of the law indicates that the arguably voluntary nature of these
conditions is insufficient, standing alone, to justify exclusion from
the Act. In drafting the PHRA the legislature defined the handicapped class solely by job-related criteria. Analysis does not disturb
their wisdom.
TERRY

S.

HYMAN

ble, the purposes are different, the assumptions behind the two standards are different.
United States v. Holloway, 148 F.2d 665, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 852
(1945). See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing at length the
continuing difficulty in reconciling medical opinion from moral judgment where an insanity
defense is offered to a criminal charge).
The fact that Social Security, Workmen's Compensation and Rehabilitation law equate
the medical and moral standard implies that outside the criminal context, the policy of encouraging conformance with societal norms can be satisfied by medical treatment alone.
169. See notes 43-59 and accompanying text supra.
170. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 952(b) (Purdon 1964).
17 1. Fagan v. National Cash Register, 481 F.2d 1115, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

